In Defence of “Good Intergovernmentalism”

von Daniela Jaros

Kaarlo Tuori’s and Klaus Tuori’s account of the the Eurozone crisis is an excellent analysis of all of its major constitutional issues. In the first chapters, the authors set the field in all necessary detail, embedding constitutional history in its economic context. They strongly focus on the distinction between two layers of Europe’s economic constitution, the microeconomic (laid down in the Treaty of Rome, and developed by the ECJ) on the one hand, and the macroeconomic layer (introduced with the Maastricht treaty) on the other hand. They correctly depict the macroeconomic constitution as a logical development of the microeconomic one by showing how the two concepts are intertwined, but also by elaborating on their differences and incoherencies, in particular with regard to changing macroeconomic premises over time. In their subsequent analysis of the Eurozone crisis, a moment in which the premises of the macroeconomic constitution have been heavily shaken, the distinction between the micro- and the macroeconomic is valuable to understand the limits of the solutions that have been adopted to tame the effects of the crisis when scrutinized from a broader constitutional perspective.

Having set the field, the authors explain the single crisis measures that have been taken on both, the institutional and the intergovernmental levels, without neglecting the particular role of the ECB, presenting the debates that surrounded them and assessing them in the light of the Pringle decision of the ECJ as well as, even though at a later stage of the book, in the light of national constitutional courts’ decisions ...

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