Interessanter Artikel zum Frage, welche Massnahmen und welche Art der Zusammenarbeit seitens der Unternehmen von den US-Behörden strafmildernd gewürdigt wird, wenn es um Verstöße gegen den Foreign Corrupt Practices Act geht. Daraus können auch deutsche Firmen eine Lehre ziehen.
tfoxlaw | August 27, 2010
Earlier this month, in the FCPA Blog, Georgetown Law student, Bruce Hinchey discussed his upcoming publication which analyzes differences between bribes paid and penalties levied against companies that do and do not self-disclose under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Using a regression analysis, Hinchey concluded that those companies which did voluntarily self-disclose paid higher fines than companies which did not self disclosure their FCPA violations to the DOJ. He concluded his post by noting that this evidence was contrary to the conventional wisdom that a company receives a benefit from self-disclosure and such evidence would ”raise questions about whether current FCPA enforcement is fundamentally fair”.
We were intrigued by this paper, as were many other commentators. However, as Hinchey’s analysis was limited to reviewing the issue of self-disclosure or not and the fine-to-bribe ratio companies pay for FCPA violations, we wondered if there were other factors which the Department of Justice (DOJ) might take into account when assessing a fine and if so, what some of these factors might be?
On Wednesday of this week, the FCPA Professor answered this question, in part, in his post on the FCPA enforcement actions against two US companies – Alliance One International, Inc. and Universal Corporation, discussing the factors the DOJ took into account when calculating the fines and penalties for both companies ...Zum vollständigen Artikel